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AN ANALYSIS OF TERRYv. OHIO AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS UPON THE CALIFORNIA
LAW OF "STOP AND FRISK"
The controversy surrounding the legality of police "stop and
frisk" practices at last has been partially resolved by the Supreme
Court. In the case of Terry v. Ohio,' which is further illuminated by
its companion case Sibron v. New York,2 the Court established a
constitutional standard for the frisk under the search and seizure
clause of the fourth amendment. Additionally,it strongly suggested
that the same standard would be applied to the stop.' Thus, not
only did the Court resolve the debate in favor of this often
employed police practice, 4 but under the doctrine of Mapp v. Ohio,
5
the standard it set applies to the states.
1. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2. 392 U.S. 40 (1968). The significance of Sibron is that it illustrates an illegal
application of the limited search or "frisk." In Sibron, a uniformed policeman observed the
defendant from four until twelve a.m. near 7th and Broadway in New York City. He saw
him conversing with six to eight known narcotics addicts. The patrolman did not overhear
the conversations nor see anything pass between the addicts and Sibron. Later, the officer
saw Sibron go into a restaurant and speak with three addicts. The officer approached Sibron
and asked him to follow him outside. He said, "You know what I am after." As Sibron
reached into his pocket, the officer thrust his hand in also and discovered glassine envelopes
containing heroin. Sibron was convicted of possessing heroin. The issue on appeal was
whether the heroin was admissible in evidence.
The Supreme Court rejected on two grounds the theory that the heroin was retrieved
during a self-protective search for weapons. The first was that the officer had no reasonable
suspicion that Sibron was armed. The fact that he was speaking with addicts and that he
stuck his hand into his pocket in response to the officer's statement, "You know what I am
after," would not justify a claim that Sibron was thought to be armed. Second, the Court
said that the scope of the search exceeded the bounds of a limited search. The officer did not
attempt a superficial pat-down for weapons, but instead thrust his hand directly into
Sibron's pocket. Thus, the heroin was held to be improperly admitted.
Consolidated in the same decision was Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). New
York sought to justify the police action under New York's "stop and frisk" statute. The
Supreme Court rejected this theory, deciding there was probable cause for an arrest, and
Peters' conviction was upheld.
3. See textual material accompanying note 18 infra.
4. In some states, the practice is authorized by statutes. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, §§ 1902, 1903 (1953). Section 1902 is an example of a detention statute authorizing a
police officer to stop a person abroad whom he has reasonable ground to suspect is
committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime for purposes of checking his
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This note will seek: (1) To analyze Terry v. Ohio to determine
what the standard is, what trends are suggested by the dicta, where
problem areas remain in applying the standard; and (2) to discuss
the California law of "stop and frisk" in order to ascertain how the
California practice correlates to the constitutional standard defined
in Terry v. Ohio: what practices are compatible and which appear
either below the minimum standard or in need of greater clarity.
I. Terry v. Ohio
One afternoon, Terry and Chilton stood together on a
downtown corner in Cleveland. Each alternately walked down the
street, paused in front of a particular store window, walked on,
turned around, peered in again, rejoined his companion, and
conferred a moment. This was repeated five or six times,
comprising about twelve trips. A third man briefly joined the two
and then walked off. After completing these maneuvers, the two
men followed the path taken by the third. An experienced
policeman, witnessing this sequence of events, followed the two and
saw them join the third man. The officer approached, identified
himself, and asked them their names. They mumbled an answer.
The policeman then grabbed Terry, patted down his outer-clothing,
and felt a gun. Unable to reach it, he removed the coat and retrieved
the gun. On the basis of testimony describing this incident and the
introduction into evidence of the gun and bullets, Terry was
convicted of carrying a concealed weapon. Certiorari was granted
to determine whether the admission of the gun and bullets violated
petitioner's fourth amendment rights.
The issue was framed as follows: "[W]hether it is always
unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a
identification and ascertaining his destination. If the answers are unsatisfactory, the officer
may detain the individual for up to two hours for further questioning and investigation.
Section 1903 authorizes the officer to search for weapons whenever he has reasonable
grounds to believe he is in danger if the detained individual possesses a gun; HAWAII REV.
LAWS §§ 255-4, -5, -8, -9 (1955) which provide for a more controlled stop and frisk practice
than the Delaware statutes. For example, Section 255-4 allows police to arrest without a
warrant a person found under suspicious circumstances in an area where a crime was
committed and the offender is unknown; N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 180(a) (McKinney
Supp. 1967) which is similar to Delaware's statute except there is no detention provision,
In some states, stop and frisk is authorized by case law. See, e.g., People v. Mickelson,
59 Cal. 2d 448, 380 P.2d 658, 30 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1963); State v. Chronister, 353 P.2d 493
(Okla. Crim. App. 1960).
5. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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limited search for weapons unless there is probable cause for an
arrest."1
6
Confronting the court were the traditional constitutional
argument "that the authority of the police must be strictly
circumscribed by the law of arrest and search as it has developed to
date,"7 and the policy argument that the police need an "escalating
set of flexible responses, graduated in relation to the amount of
information they possess.'' However, the fact that so many
policemen are killed or wounded each year, primarily by guns or
knives, was the most significant consideration.9 In reaching its
decision, the Court rejected the suggestion that stop and frisk do
not come under the purview of the fourth amendment and declared
that a stop is a seizure and the frisk is a search. 0 Applying the
"reasonableness" test prescribed by the fourth amendment, it
concluded that the governmental interest in crime prevention and
detection, plus the governmental and police interest in disarming a
person who might kill the investigating officer or harm passersby,
justified a limited search for weapons on less than probable cause
for arrest.
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads
him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom
he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous; where in
the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries; and where nothing
in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for
the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
6. 392 U.S. at 15.
7. Id. at 11. See Terry wherein Justice Douglas, dissenting, states that a search and
seizure is unconstitutional unless there is probable cause to believe that (1) a crime has been
committed, (2) a crime was in the process of being committed or (3) a crime was about to be
committed. Id. at 35. See generally, Raphael, "'Stop and Frisk" in a Nutshell: Some Last
Editorial Thrusts and Parries Before It All Becomes History, 20 ALA. L. REV. 294
(1968); Notes and Comments, Stop and Frisk: A Perspective, 53 CORNELL L. REV.
899 (1967-68) in which the authors analyze policy considerations of stop and frisk, and
conclude that the standard is too flexible and subjective to protect individual rights.
8. 392 U.S. at 10. See Kuh, Reflections on New Yoyks "Stop-and-Frisk" Law and Its
Claimed Unconstitutionality, 56 J. CRIN. L.C. & P.S. 32"(1965) where the author concludes
stop and frisk is not only constitutional but deeply rooted in common law, and that it can be
a valuable tool of police practice if applied reasonably.
9. 392 U.S. at 23-24 & n.21 in which statistics of recent deaths and assaults of police
officers are recited.
10. 392 U.S. at 16.
1969] •
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carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in
an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault
him."
Essentially, this case is concerned with the justification for and
the scope of the limited search. The Court concluded that the right
to search for weapons arises when the policeman can articulate the
grounds for a reasonable suspicion which, in the light of his
experience, justifies this intrusion; the scope of the search must be
confined to one aimed at the discovery of dangerous weapons.
Thus, the Court approved a superficial pat-down of the outer-
clothing: only if a policeman believes that he feels a dangerous
weapon may he place his hands inside the clothing to extrtct the
item.
2
The Supreme Court impliedly recognized in Terry the right to
seize (or stop) the individual to make an investigation on grounds
less than the probable cause required to make an arrest. 3 In writing
for the Court, Chief Justice Warren stated that a seizure occurs
"whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his
freedom to walk away ... .""1 Additionally, according to the
standard set, the right to conduct a limited search arises if, after
investigating the suspect, nothing dispels the officer's suspicion that
the suspect may be armed. 5 It is carefully pointed out that "a
police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of
investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no
probable cause to make an arrest."'' 6 Additionally, the facts in this
11. Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
12. Id. See discussion of Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) in note 2 supra.
13. But see 392 U.S. at 19 n.16 where the Court states that it is deciding nothing
concerning the propriety of an investigative seizure upon less than probable cause for arrest
because, from the record, it is not clear whether the investigating officer so seized Terry prior
to the search.
14. 392 U.S. at 16.
15. Id. at 30. See also Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in which he states the fol-
lowing:
[I]f the frisk is justified in order to protect the officer during an encounter with a
citizen, the officer must first have constitutional grounds to insist on an
encounter, to make a forcible stop. Any person, including a policeman, is at
liberty to avoid a person he considers dangerous. If and when a policeman has a
right instead to disarm such a person for his own protection, he must first have a
right not to avoid him but to be in his presence.
Id. at 32.
16. 392 U.S. at 22.
[Vol. 6
CO MMENTS
case which justified Officer McFadden in approaching Terry are
recited in detail.
In deciding Terry, the Court was not compelled to "canvass in
detail the constitutional limitations upon the scope of a policeman's
power when he confronts a citizen without probable cause to arrest
him. 11 7 However, it appears the same standard will be applied to
justify both the limited seizure and search: The officer must ,observe
unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in the
light of his experience that the particular intrusion (a seizure or
search) is necessary. 8 There is little indication, however, what the
scope of the limited seizure will be-how much force can be used to
detain the individual or how long he may be detained-other than
that the conduct of the officer will have to meet the test of
reasonableness as the Court develops it.
Assuming the standard for the search and seizure to be the
same, the circumstances necessary to validate the search may be
different from those justifying the seizure. For example, if the
suspected offense were a non-violent one, such. as a narcotics
violation or pick-pocketing, the facts justifying the seizure of the
individual for questioning undoubtedly would not alone justify the
protective search; the officer would be required to point to factors
other than the suspected offense which supported a belief that the
individual was armed.19 In a case similar to Terry where a violent
crime was suspected, the same facts probably would be sufficient to
support a limited seizure and protective search. Indeed, Justice
Harlan, in his concurring opinion, suggested that if the reason for
the stop is to invpstigate a crime of violence, the right to frisk must
be immediate and automatic."
In both Terry and its companion case Sibron, the police officer
suspected a particular crime, armed robbery and possession of
narcotics, respectively; hence, it is not yet certain if the required
suspicion of "criminal activity" justifying a limited search or
seizure refers to a specific crime or can be more broadly applied to
suspicious behavior conducive to a variety of crimes.
17. Id. at 16.
18. Id. at 21-22.
19. See discussion of Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)'at note 2 supra. What
factors would support the limited search has not yet been determined by the Supreme Court.
It is implied in Sibron that if the officer had a reasonable belief that Sibron was reaching for
a weapon when he reached into his pocket, a frisk would have been justified. Id. at 64 &
n.21.
20. 392 U.S. at 33.
1969]
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II. The Law of the Limited Search and Seizure in California
A. Seizure
In California, there is no statutory authority for a limited
seizure of suspicious individuals; rather, this practice is approved
by case law." The traditional standard is generally expressed as
follows:
[A] police officer may question a person outdoors at night when
the circumstances are such as would indicate to a reasonable
man in like position that such a course is necessary to the
discharge of the officer's duties.23
Contrary to the implication of the quoted standard, it seems to
be applied by the courts to support the fact that California
recognizes the right to conduct a limited seizure, and not to qualify
that right. Although the majority of detentions do occur outdoors
at night, there are cases approving daytime detentions24 and indoor
detentions.25 The primary requirement is that there be some
suspicious or unusual circumstances to which the officer can refer
to justify his interference; the mere hunch or unfounded suspicion
of a policeman will not suffice. 6 Although it is impossible to
compile an exhaustive list of suspicious circumstances which the
courts have upheld,27 the following are some of the more frequent:
21. There are general crime prevention and detection statutes, however, which can be
referred to as justifying the practice of stopping a suspicious person: See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§ 26600, 26602 (West 1955) (Sheriff shall preserve peace and prevent and suppress
any affrays, breaches of the peace, riots, and insurrections). See also CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 647(e) (West 1955), as amended (West Supp. 1967), which provides that a person is guilty
of disorderly conduct if he is loitering on the streets and refuses to identify himself and
account for his presence when so requested by a peace officer when surrounding
circumstances indicate the identification is needed for public safety. The constitutionality of
this statute was recently upheld in People v. Weger, 251 Cal. App. 2d 584, 59 Cal. Rptr. 661
(1967) cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1047 (1968).
22. Gisske v. Sanders, 9 Cal. App. 13, 98 P. 43 (1908), is one of the earliest cases
expressly recognizing this authority.
23. People v. Barquera, 207 Cal. App. 2d 725, 728, 24 Cal. Rptr. 675, 676 (1962).
24. E.g., People v. Parham, 60 Cal. 2d 378, 348 P.2d 1001, 33 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1963);
People v. Sanchez, 189 Cal. App. 2d 720, I1 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1961); People v. Green, 183
Cal. App. 2d 736, 7 Cal. Rptr. 235 (1960).
25. E.g., People v. Beasley, 250 Cal. App. 2d 71, 58 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1967); People v.
Machel, 234 Cal. App. 2d 37, 44 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 839 (1965);
People v. Sanchez, 191 Cal. App. 2d 783, 12 Cal. Rptr. 906 (1961).
26. Peoplev. Cowman, 223 Cal. App. 2d 109, 116, 35 Cal. Rptr. 528, 533-(1963).
27. People v. Henze, 253 Cal. App. 2d 986, 989-90, 161 Cal. Rptr. 545, 547-48 (1967),
contains an analysis of some of the more frequently court approved "suspicious"
circumstances. See L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTIRE, JR., & D. ROTHENBERG, DETECTION OF
CRIME, Part 1 (1967) for a thorough analysis of what the police consider to be circumstances
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(1) A furtive act;" (2) a tip, particularly one coming through police
channels; 9 (3) the location of the suspect, e.g., in a high crime area
or an area where a crime has recently been reported;30 (4) the time
seen;3" (5) known reputation of the individual as a criminal or
suspect;32 (6) association of the suspect with other suspects or
known criminals; 33 and (7) erratic driving or the commission of a
traffic violation.3" In most cases, of course, there is a combination
of these and other factors which leads the policeman to detain an
individual for investigation.
There is a growing trend among the California appellate
courts to demand that there be not only unusual circumstances to
which the suspect is linked, but also some suggestion that the
warranting a reasonable suspicion. It is stated that in addition to particular factors (such as
the individual's record) there is usually present a combination of general factors which
places the individual in a group or setting which police believe warrants investigation. These
general factors are sex, age, race, general appearance of the suspect, time of day, and crime
rate of the location. Id. at 19. It is the police reliance on these general factors which causes
much of the criticism of stop and frisk since, by their applidation, minority groups are often
subjected to police interrogation and the limited search. In Terry, the Supreme Court re-
flects an awareness of the harassment problems. However, it reasons that the exclusionary
rule is an ineffective tool to combat this, particularly since the police often decide not to
prosecute. 392 U.S. at 12-14 & n.ll.
28. E.g., People v. Wigginton, 254 Adv. Cal. App. 353, 62 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1967);
People v. Randal, 226 Cal. App. 2d 105, 37 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1964).
29. E.g., People v. Russell, 259 Adv. Cal. App. 674, 66 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1968), modified
260 Adv. Cal. App. 300 (1968); People v. Perez, 259 Adv. Cal. App. 391, 66 Cal. Rptr. 473
(1968).
30. E.g., People v. Parham, 60 Cal. 2d 378, 348 P.2d 1001, 33 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1963);
People v. Reed, 260 Adv. Cal. App. 933, 67 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1968). Because of the high crime
rate of ghetto areas, this factor stimulates protests of police discrimination and harassment
by persons residing in such areas. See note 27 supra.
31. E.g., People v. Cruppi, 265 Adv. Cal. App. 13, 71 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1968) (5:15
a.m.); People v. Rogers, 241 Cal. App. 2d 384, 50 Cal. Rptr. 559 (1966) (4:00 a.m.). This
factor is often combined with location in that the suspect is seen at an unusual hour
where no businesses are open, and thus there is no apparent explanation for his presence.
32. E.g., People v. Ambrose, 199 Cal. App. 2d 846, 19 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962); People v.
Sanchez, 191 Cal. App. 2d 783, 12 Cal. Rptr. 906 (1961).
33. E.g., People v. Britton, 264 Adv. Cal. App. 843, 70 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1968);
People v. Ambrose, 199 Cal. App. 2d 846, 19 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962).
34. E.g., People v. McVey, 243 Cal. App. 2d 215, 52 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1966); People v.
Gibson, 220 Cal. App. 2d 15, 33 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1963). The California Supreme Court has
supported the frequent practice of police in stopping automobiles in order to investigate a
driver or passenger. People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 450, 380 P.2d 658, 660, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 18, 21 (1963). Neither Terry nor Sibron involves the problem of stopping autos; in
both cases, the officer searched a pedestrian. The question which arises is will post-Terry
decisions affect the practice of stopping cars? Because of the policy reasons behind the
decision, notably the need of crime prevention and detection, a reasonable stop of a car
would probably be approved by the Supreme Court.
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activity is related to crime.35 Although in practical effect this may
be no different from the traditional standard which requires merely
unusual or suspicious activity,36 it does insure that the police will
specify why they believed the suspect was involved in criminal
behavior. Thus, on its face, this trend appears closer to the standard
suggested by Terry v. Ohio37 than does the traditional one.
California is in accord with the Supreme Court in recognizing
that the suspicious circumstances must be tested in light of an
officer's experience. For example, in People v. Beasley,"5 two
experienced policemen on the pawi shop patrol stopped to
interrogate a man and his companion when the prospective
customer could not produce identification at the broker's request.
The court concluded that as a result of their long experience, the
policemen had developed a modus operandi whereby lack of
identification indicated the individual was using a fictitious name,
and use of a fictitious name implied that his ownership was suspect.
The court concluded that:
In evaluating the total situation that confronted [the policemen]
as they entered the pawnshop we may consider their training and
experience as police officers and their expertise in the area of
detecting suspicious circumstances which, to an ordinary
individual, might appear innocent. 39
Just how much influence the experience of the policeman has is
unclear. For example, in contrast to Beasley, is the case of People
v. Henze40 in which police officers saw two men seated in a park in
the afternoon. One officer observed them through binoculars and
testified they appeared to be counting coins and passing them back
and forth. As the men stood up, one appeared to be placing a roll of
coins in his pocket. The police followed their car and stopped them
for an investigation which later led to an arrest for burglary. The
court held the detention unjustified.4 To the layman, neither lack of
35. E.g., People v. Villareal, 262 Adv. Cal. App. 442, 68 Cal. Rptr. 610 (1968)
(individual resembling suspected parole violator was seen leaving suspect's house at night
and refused to stop when the police commanded thus lending credence to the belief he was the
violator and justifying a stop); People v. Reed, 260 Adv. Cal. App. 933, 67 Cal, Rptr. 514
(1968) (suspect furtively carrying garment bag at 9:15 p.m. in high frequency crime area
held sufficient to link him with a possible burglary, and a stop was proper).
36. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
37. 392 U.S. at 30.
38. 250 Cal. App. 2d 71, 58 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1967).
39. Id. at 79, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 490 (citations omitted).




identification in a pawn shop nor counting coins and passing them
back and forth in a park might be particularly suspicious.
However, in evaluating suspicious circumstances, the court
appeared more inclined to rely on police experience in Beasley than
in Henze.1
2
In theory, the California standard governing the limited
seizure does not differ appreciably from the standard suggested by
Terry v. Ohio-it demands suspicious circumstances and tests them
through the experience of the officer. However, because the
Supreme Court has not yet decided a case involving a limited
seizure, it is difficult to predict how the constitutional standard will




The right to search a suspicious individual for weapons on less
than probable cause for arrest is also a product of California case
law. A typical statement of this right declares that:
The right to investigate gives rise to the right to conduct a
reasonable superficial search for concealed weapons to protect
the safety of the officers, if the circumstances warrant it.
44
In many of the pre-Terry cases, circumstances warranting a
protective search were not carefully analyzed, and thus, it often
appeared as though the right to stop gave rise to an automatic right
to search for weapons. 4 More recently, however, the courts have
42. It should be noted that the Henze case was decided by a court demanding that the
unusual circumstances be apparently related to crime. Thus, the effect of this criterion may
be to restrict the subjectivity of the police in deciding when to investigate.
43. Wainwright v. New Orleans, 248 La. 1097, 184 So. 2d 23 (1966) cert. granted, 385
U.S. 1001 (1967), was believed to be the case which would bring the issue of a forced stop
before the Supreme Court. However, in a per curiam decision, the Court dismissed the writ
of certiorari as "improvidently granted." 392 U.S. 598 (1968).
44. People v. Alvarado, 250 Cal. App. 2d 584, 590, 58 Cal. Rptr. 822, 825 (1967).
45. E.g., People v. Davis, 260 Adv. Cal. App. 182, 67 Cal. Rptr. 54 (1968). Policemen
saw defendant walking through a parking lot of a gas station at 2:15 a.m. in an area
frequented by burglars. They stopped him and frisked him immediately discovering burglary
weapons. The court approved his conduct by the police. People v. McGlory, 226 Cal. App.
2d 762, 38 Cal. Rptr. 373 (1964). The police saw two suspects seated in a car in a high
frequency narcotics area; after noting the bulge between the breasts of one suspect, the police
ordered them out of the car for a frisk. There was no indication that the police believed the
two to be armed. In upholding the police procedure, the court commented:
The evasive answers of Miss Thomas concerning the bulge between her breasts
would justify the inference that the bulge might be contraband. This, in turn,
justified the search for weapons.
1969]
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begun to carefully survey the facts in order to determine whether an
officer is justified in this temporary invasion of privacy.46
Bearing in mind that California courts have often neglected to
explain the circumstances justifying a protective search, the
situations validating a pat-down seem to fall into two broad
categories: (1) Police investigation of a suspected crime of
violence;47 and (2) absent a crime of violence, circumstances in
which the officer can point to factors which make him fear for his
safety, such as, a quick movement on the part of the suspect as if he
were reaching for a weapon,"5 the number of suspects and their
location, 9 or a police report that the suspect or his companion may
be armed. 0 This application seems compatible with Terry.',
Prior to the Terry decision, the scope of a search was not
always restricted. Some previous decisions limited the search to a
superficial pat-down, and allowed the police officer to penetrate the
clothing only if he believed that he felt a dangerous weapon. 2 Other
decisions apparently sanctioned the right of the officers to go
directly into the suspect's pockets without a prior cursory search
indicating the possibility of dangerous weapons." The more recent
post-Terry California cases demonstrate a determination to meet
Id. at 765, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 375. See also 18 HASTINGS L.J. 623, 630 (1966-67) where the
author concludes that circumstances justifying a stop are sufficient to justify a frisk.
4t,. People v. Smith, 264 Adv. Cal. App. 850, 70 Cal. Rptr. 591 (1968), held that it
was reasonable to search an individual for arms in the company of a robbery suspect who
was carrying a loaded gun; People v. Britton, 264 Adv. Cal. App. 843, 70 Cal. Rptr. 586
(1968), held that when police made a valid stop of the defendant and saw the barrel of a rifle
protruding under the front seat, they were justified in making a protective search.
47. People v. Smith, 264 Adv. Cal. App. 850, 70 Cal. Rptr. 591 (1968) armed
robbery); People v. Lewis, 187 Cal. App. 2d 373, 9 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1960) (burglaries).
48. People v. Sanchez, 256 Adv. Cal. App. 779, 64 Cal. Rptr. 331 (1967).
49. People v. Alcala, 204 Cal. App. 2d 15, 22 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1962). The police stopped
defendant because they suspected he was driving while intoxicated. The court held that the
number of men in the car (five) plus the fact that the event occurred at 2:00 a.m. justified a
protective search.
50. People v. Hastings, 253 Cal. App. 2d 191, 61 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1967).
51. See text accompanying notes 19 & 20 supra.
52. E.g., People v. Rich, 259 Adv. Cal. App. 418, 66 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1968); People v.
Martines, 228 Cal. App. 2d 245, 39 Cal. Rptr. 526 (1964).
53. E.g., People v. Koelzer, 222 Cal. App. 2d 20, 34 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1963) (the search of
one suspect revealed a pair of plastic gloves and a Volkswagen key); People v. One 1958
Chevrolet, 179 Cal. App. 2d 604, 4 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1960) (during a search, a marijuana
cigarette was found in the suspect's pocket). Terry establishes that an officer can not reach
into the pockets unless he believes he feels a weapon. 392 U.S. at 30. In both cases previously
mentioned, the facts do not indicate that the officer felt a suspicious object or that he made a
superficial pat-down before retrieving the objects from the defendants' pockets.
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the constitutional standard. In People v. Britton,54 for example, the
policeman felt a soft bag in the defendant's pocket; when it was
removed and analyzed, it was found to contain marijuana. The
court applied the exclusionary rule to the marijuana holding that:
By requiring defendant to empty his pockets and by removing
from his pocket a soft pouch which had no possible use as a
weapon, the search exceeded the bounds of a permissible
"frisk.""
Although the traditional California standard for the limited
search for weapons does not differ substantially from that
announced in Terry v. Ohio, Terry will affect the application and
scope of the search. It appears that the policeman will be required
to describe circumstances warranting the search more specifically
than heretofore. Further, the courts will be required to exclude
evidence seized from the person unless the officer has conducted a
proper superficial search.
III. Conclusion
In deciding Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court has not only
given constitutional recognition to the frequently applied police
practice of stop and frisk, but has demanded that this practice meet
the fourth amendment's standard of reasonableness. Terry
demonstrates how that standard will be applied to the protective
search for weapons and strongly suggests the way in which it will
apply to the limited seizure. Yet, the problem with Terry, if it can
be called a problem, is that the suspicious circumstances are so
glaring. Certainly, such conduct as witnessed by the policeman
would lead even a reasonable layman to believe that criminal
activity was afoot and that the suspect might be armed. Most of the
cases reported in California are not so clear. A policeman Observes
a few unusual or suspicious circumstances and has to make a quick
decision as to whether he should investigate or search. Terry will
not help him make this decision. At this writing, the constitutional
standard imposed by Terry is ill-defined; the boundary separating a
reasonable stop and frisk from an unjustified invasion of privacy is
uncertain. For example, if the officer saw Terry make one trip, but
also knew he had a record for burglary, or that he was a burglary
suspect, or that several stores in the area had recently been robbed,
54. 264 Adv. Cal. App. 843, 70 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1968).
55. Id. at 849.
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would there have been a right to detain? If the suspects were
"casing" the store after it was closed, thus negating a theory of
armed robbery, what additional facts would justify a search? While
such questions are surely academic, they illustrate the type of
situations usually confronting the police.
Flexibility in the law is to be desired, and a rigid set of rules
which will bind the courts and forbid them to properly evaluate the
peculiar facts of each case should not be expected. Nonetheless,
greater certainty in the application and scope of the limited search
and seizure is needed to insure not only effective police practice, but
the privacy of the individual.
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